Forced to Resign After Cancer Treatment: When an Employer’s Policy Cannot Override Its Duty of Care ([2026] SGECT 10)

What happened

The employee had worked for many years in an administrative support role at an international school in Singapore. In 2024 she was diagnosed with cancer and went through months of treatment. In June 2025 her oncologist certified her fit to return to work but recommended light duties because of the lasting side effects of treatment [12]. An occupational therapist wrote in support of her rehabilitation sessions, recommending light duties, short breaks and time for those sessions [14]. She gave both documents to the employer [15], [16].

In August 2025 her line manager agreed to short breaks, the therapy sessions and a second day of working from home each week [26], [27]. He later raised concerns internally that her absences were disrupting the department [31] to [34]. At a meeting on 7 October 2025 a senior member of the school’s leadership told her that she must be on campus five days a week with immediate effect, because her role was ineligible for flexible working under the school’s policy [39]. She was told that her medical documents were not a “Light Duties Medical Certificate” and that an occupational therapist’s memo could not substitute for one [40]. She was also directed to attend a fit-for-work assessment at a clinic chosen by the school [43].

The school’s appointed doctor confirmed continuing restrictions and recommended one day working from home for an initial two months [45], [46]. The HR team then emailed him repeatedly asking whether the work-from-home recommendation was “mandatory” until he withdrew it [47] to [50]. On 3 November 2025 the employer confirmed that there would be no working from home, that the physical restriction recommended by the appointed doctor would be accommodated only for a limited period unless a certificate in the prescribed form was produced, and that early release for her rehabilitation sessions would be subject to a new restriction that made the sessions harder to attend [53], [55], [59]. An HR email of 7 November 2025 said there was no medical evidence to support her requests and that she was “deemed fit for work without restrictions” [74], [75].

Her physical and mental health deteriorated [95]. Her oncologist issued a further note confirming lasting side effects and asking that she remain on light duties [97]. After extended medical leave and a call with her oncologist, she resigned on 19 December 2025 [101], [102]. Her last day was 18 January 2026 [103]. She lodged a mediation request within a month and the claim followed [106]. Neither side had a lawyer at the hearing.

What the tribunal decided

The duty of care depends on the employee. An employer owes every employee an implied contractual duty to take reasonable care of their health and safety. The tribunal held that the practical content of that duty is not uniform. It varies with the circumstances of the individual employee, so an employer on notice of an employee’s medical vulnerability owes heightened practical demands compared to employees at large [18], [19]. The starting point is that the employer must reasonably investigate, consider and respond to health matters drawn to its attention [25].

Policies and operational needs must yield to the duty. The tribunal accepted that documentation and flexible working policies serve a useful purpose [64], [65]. But it held that “An employer cannot take refuge in the letter of a policy of its own making to escape the reach of its duties.” [66]. Where an employer knows or ought to know that an employee faces a real risk of harm, its policies and operational targets must give way to the duty of care [67].

Form and source of medical advice are beside the point. Three healthcare professionals had recommended accommodations. The tribunal held it was irrelevant whether that advice was expressed in a medical certificate or in recommendatory rather than mandatory language, and that an occupational therapist’s opinion was not less worthy of consideration than a doctor’s [83]. In the tribunal’s words, “An ordinarily prudent employer does not parse the form and provenance of medical opinion to avoid engaging with its substance.” [83]. The employer’s documentation policy had distorted its understanding of its duty; the duty should have shaped the policy, not the reverse [81]. No reasonable employer needs a doctor to draft a manual of mandatory directives before it can form a view on what its own employee’s health requires [82].

The employer breached the duty. The insistence on a particular form of document was a pretext for avoiding a reasonable investigation of the employee’s needs [86]. The employer arrived at the 7 October meeting already entrenched, with no room for negotiation, and was already in breach at that point [90]. HR’s emails to the school’s doctor were not a real attempt at clarification but were framed to steer him to a predetermined conclusion [70]. Rejecting his recommendation and placing obstacles in the way of rehabilitation sessions deepened the breach [91]. The breach was fundamental and went to the root of the contract [92].

But the duty has limits. The tribunal accepted that the department was difficult to run during the employee’s absences and said the duty does not require an employer to capitulate to every request at the expense of its legitimate business requirements [87]. What it requires is practical judgment: weighing operational requirements against the employee’s medical status, her likely recovery, the types of accommodation needed, the risk if accommodation is refused, the impact on colleagues and available alternatives [88]. No particular outcome was mandated. One fixed work-from-home day, part-time cover, a trial arrangement or even no work from home at all might have been reasonable, had they been reached through real engagement with the employee [89].

Mutual trust and confidence. The tribunal also found a breach of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence, on the basis that a fundamental breach of the duty of care undermines the trust on which employment depends [93], [94]. The tribunal acknowledged that the status of this term is not clearly settled at appellate level in Singapore, although it has been recognised and applied in the High Court [7]. This is a first-instance decision and that point remains open.

When a resignation is a dismissal. The Employment Act defines “dismiss” to include a resignation where the employee shows, on a balance of probabilities, that she did not resign voluntarily but was forced to by the employer’s conduct [111]. The tribunal held that this statutory test differs from the common law concept of constructive dismissal, which turns on repudiatory breach, and was cautious about importing the common law test directly [111], [112]. “Forced” does not mean the employee lost all capacity to do otherwise, and it does not require that every alternative was foreclosed [114], [115]. The tribunal’s view was that an employee is forced to resign “where the employer’s conduct has left the employee with no practical alternative or choice but to resign, assessed by reference to what it was reasonable to conclude in the circumstances” [116]. The inquiry is objective but takes account of the employee’s particular situation, including her medical condition. A subjective feeling of having no choice is not enough, and the employer’s conduct must be the operative cause of the resignation [116], [117]. The tribunal expressly declined to lay down a full account of these concepts and left open the wider relationship between the statutory and common law tests [113], [121]. It did observe that where a breach is serious enough to justify termination at common law, it struggled to imagine a case where resignation would not also be a reasonable response [120].

Application. The employer’s persistent failure placed the employee in a dilemma: stay and risk further deterioration of her health, or resign to protect it. She reasonably chose her health, so her resignation was a dismissal under the Act [118], [122].

Just cause or excuse is a separate question. A resignation treated as a dismissal is not automatically without just cause or excuse; the tribunal must separately ask whether the employer had just cause or excuse at the time of the resignation [123], [125]. Dismissal on the ground of a medical condition can be just cause or excuse, depending on the facts [130]. The employer should approach the issue with care, sensitivity and respect for the employee as a human being [131], and should make a reasonable inquiry into the condition and its likely duration, its effect on the role, operational needs, alternative roles and possible accommodations, consulting the employee as part of that inquiry [134], [135]. The quality of that inquiry is central to whether any resulting dismissal is with just cause or excuse [136]. The tribunal made clear that there was no evidence the employer had been considering dismissal; the framework was applied to test the just cause question [129].

Here the employer failed to consult the employee and declined to engage with the medical advice because none of it was a medical certificate. A prudent employer would have periodically reviewed and consulted her while providing adjustments, and the evidence pointed to an improving trajectory. The absence of a guaranteed recovery was a reason for patience and continued engagement, not haste [137], [139]. The dismissal was without just cause or excuse [140].

Remedies. The claim was allowed at $20,000 in full: $15,240, being three months’ salary, for loss of income, and $4,760 for harm [140]. Remaining out of work to focus on recovery was reasonable and did not reduce the award [141]. The tribunal would have assessed harm at three months’ salary, but its $20,000 monetary limit confined the harm component to the balance [142]. The employee was awarded $400 in costs and $70 in disbursements [143].

Two factual points are worth noting. The line manager was not called; the tribunal noted his account came second-hand through the principal, though it treated the point as immaterial because it was common ground she worked from home two days a week [28] to [30]. The employee’s allegation that her manager had been monitoring her timings was rejected because it rested on her suspicions alone [44].

What this means for employers

• Engage with the substance of medical advice, not its form or source. A memo from a treating doctor, a recommendation rather than a directive, or an opinion from an occupational therapist all count [83]. Demanding a prescribed document before acknowledging any duty was found to be a pretext [86]. If you need more detail, ask the employee or the clinician for it.
• Do not let policy override the duty of care. Flexible working and medical documentation policies are legitimate tools, but where you know or ought to know of a real risk to an employee’s health they must yield [66], [67], [87]. The duty should shape the policy, not the reverse [81].
• Investigate, consider and respond before deciding. The employer here formed its position before the first meeting and left no room for negotiation [90]. The tribunal did not require any particular outcome. A trial arrangement, part-time cover or a single work-from-home day might all have been reasonable, and so might a refusal, provided it followed real consultation [89].
• Do not lobby your own appointed doctor. Repeated emails asking whether a work-from-home recommendation was “mandatory”, followed by an internal note that the doctor had “concurred”, showed a position fixed in advance and deepened the breach [70], [91].
• Review periodically and keep first-hand evidence of what was agreed. A prudent employer inquires into the condition, its likely duration, the effect on the role, alternatives and accommodations, consults the employee, and then reviews as recovery progresses [134] to [137]. As noted above, the line manager was not called and his account came second-hand through the principal [28] to [30]; first-hand evidence of what was agreed is easier to rely on.

What this means for employees

• A resignation can be a dismissal. You must show, on a balance of probabilities, that you did not resign voluntarily but were forced to by the employer’s conduct [111]. The test is whether that conduct left you with no practical alternative but to resign, judged objectively but in light of your situation, including a medical condition [116].
• Feeling that you had no choice is not enough on its own. The tribunal said subjective conviction, however deeply felt, does not suffice, and the employer’s conduct must be the operative cause of the resignation [116], [117]. Even then, the tribunal separately asks whether the employer had just cause or excuse, and a medical condition can in principle be just cause depending on the facts and the quality of the employer’s inquiry [123] to [125], [130].
• Document your needs and put requests in writing. The memoranda from the oncologist and occupational therapist, the appointed doctor’s notes, and the employee’s email asking what a “light duties” certificate should contain [56] were central to the findings. Allegations that rest on suspicion alone, such as the monitoring claim here, did not succeed [44] and are unlikely to.
• Mind the gateway steps and the cap. A wrongful dismissal claim must be lodged at TADM within one month of the last day of employment, and mediation precedes any tribunal claim. This employee filed within a month of her last day [103], [106]. The tribunal’s limit is $20,000, or $30,000 with union or Tripartite Mediation Framework assistance, and here that cap cut the harm award from a notional $15,240 to $4,760 [142]. Parties are not represented by lawyers at the hearing. See our guide to TADM and the Employment Claims Tribunals.
• Staying out of work to recover was accepted. The employee remained unemployed to focus on her recovery, and the tribunal treated that as reasonable when assessing loss of income [141]. Costs were modest: $400 plus $70 in disbursements [143].

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Frequently asked questions

What counts as constructive dismissal under the Singapore Employment Act?

Section 2(1) of the Employment Act defines “dismiss” to include a resignation where the employee shows, on a balance of probabilities, that she did not resign voluntarily but was forced to by the employer’s conduct or omissions [111]. In [2026] SGECT 10 the tribunal held that this differs from the common law test based on repudiatory breach [112]. An employee is forced to resign where the employer’s conduct left her with no practical alternative but to resign, judged objectively but with regard to her particular situation, and the employer’s conduct must be the operative cause [116], [117]. The tribunal said it would not attempt to lay down a fully developed account and offered brief observations [113].

Does my employer have to accept a doctor’s memo recommending light duties, or can it insist on a light duties MC?

On this decision, an employer cannot refuse to engage with medical advice simply because it is headed “memo” rather than “medical certificate”, or because it “recommends” rather than directs light duties. The tribunal held that the form and source of medical opinion are beside the point, and that an occupational therapist’s recommendation deserves serious consideration [83]. The employer must consider the substance of the advice and decide for itself what its employee’s health reasonably requires [82]. It may still weigh its operational needs and need not agree to every request [87], but treating a document’s label as a reason to do nothing was found to be a breach [86].

Can my employer send me for a fit-for-work assessment at its own clinic?

The decision does not rule on whether such a direction is lawful. The employer’s policy conferred a broad discretion to direct staff to a medical assessment, and the employee attended despite her reservations [43]. The assessment turned out in her favour, with the appointed doctor recommending continuing restrictions and one day at home for two months [45], [46]. The tribunal’s criticism was of what followed: HR repeatedly pressed the doctor on whether his recommendation was “mandatory” until he withdrew it, which the tribunal found was not a real attempt at clarification [70]. In practice, an employer that commissions an assessment should be prepared to act on what it says.

How much compensation can I get from the Employment Claims Tribunals for wrongful dismissal?

The tribunal’s limit is $20,000, or $30,000 where the claim went through union-assisted or Tripartite Mediation Framework mediation. Within that limit, the award in [2026] SGECT 10 was structured with reference to the Second Schedule to the Employment Claims Regulations 2017 as a loss of income component and a harm component [140]. The employee received three months’ salary for loss of income, and the tribunal would have awarded a further three months’ salary for harm, uplifted by 50% on two grounds, the employer’s fundamental breach of its duty to take reasonable care of her health and safety and the resulting deterioration in her health, but the cap limited the total to $20,000 [142]. Costs of $400 and disbursements of $70 were added [143].

This decision is one of several 2026 Employment Claims Tribunals decisions discussed in Wrongful Dismissal in Singapore: What the Employment Claims Tribunals Decided in 2026.

This article is for general information only and is not legal advice. It discusses a decision of the Employment Claims Tribunals as reported at the citation given; the parties are anonymised in the published grounds and are referred to here only as the employee and the employer. The law stated is as at September 2026.